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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
  
SEITZ, Circuit Judge. 
 This is an appeal from an order of the district court 
made final pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  In its order, the court approved a settlement with 
some but not all defendants in a securities action.  The non-
settling defendants appeal, arguing that the partial settlement 
was unfair and prejudicial to them.  The district court had 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the district 
court's order for an abuse of discretion. Walsh v. Great Atl. & 
Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 726 F.2d 956, 965 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 I. FACTS 
 International Thoroughbred Breeders ("ITB") is a Delaware 
corporation in the business of buying, selling, and leasing 
interests in thoroughbred horses for breeding.  In 1977, Garden 
State Racetrack ("Garden State") burned down.  In 1983, ITB 
proposed a plan to purchase the Garden State grounds, construct a 
new facility, and operate a thoroughbred and harness racing 
facility.  ITB raised money for this undertaking through the sale 
of securities.  At issue here are four public offerings of 
securities by ITB. 
 Plaintiffs Paulette Eichenholtz ("Eichenholtz") and Larry 
Salberg ("Salberg") sued on behalf of the class of purchasers of 
ITB securities who were allegedly without knowledge of non-public 
omissions and material misstatements in ITB's offerings of July 
  
26, 1983; April 16, 1984; July 25, 1985; and May 14, 1986.1 See 
generally JA at 485-520 (Plaintiffs' and Intervenor Plaintiffs' 
Responses to Defendants' First Set of Contention 
Interrogatories).  In addition, plaintiffs sued derivatively on 
behalf of ITB. 
 Named as defendants were First Jersey Securities, Inc. 
("First Jersey"), Rooney Pace, Inc., and First Philadelphia 
Corporation ("First Philadelphia"), all registered broker-
dealers; ITB, the company that issued the allegedly objectionable 
securities; Kerry B. Fitzpatrick, Robert J. Quigley, John J. 
Degnan, Richard J. Hughes, Ronald J. Riccio, Joseph K. Fisher, 
Herbert Barness, John W. Allen, Joseph C. Daniel, Jack Price, and 
Norman Rothstein, all past or present members of ITB's Board of 
Directors; and Robert J. Brennan (collectively, "the individual 
settling defendants"), the controlling shareholder of both First 
Jersey and ITB and Chairman of the ITB Board of Directors.2 
                     
 
    1  The Eichenholtz suit was initially filed in August 1986 
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York.  The Salberg complaint was filed in the District of New 
Jersey in July 1987.  In February 1988, the Eichenholtz complaint 
was transferred to the District of New Jersey, and it was 
consolidated with the Salberg complaint.  Thereafter, the parties 
filed an amended complaint. See Joint Appendix at 106-63 ("JA").  
Eichenholtz claims to represent the subclass of those who 
purchased ITB securities in the 1983, 1984, and 1985 offerings, 
and Salberg claims to represent those who purchased ITB 
securities in the 1986 offerings. 
     
2
  Garden State Racetrack ("Garden State"), an ITB 
subsidiary, was named as a defendant in the Eichenholtz 
Complaint, but not in the consolidated and amended complaint.  
Garden State remains in the caption in the current appeal, but is 
not a party. 
  
 The essence of the complaint is that the four public 
offerings were elaborate schemes to generate underwriting fees 
and to sell ITB securities at an inflated value.  Plaintiffs 
alleged violations of section 10(b) of the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.10b-5; sections 11, 12(2), and 17(a) of the Securities Act 
of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k,77l(2), 77q(a); and of the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1961-1968. 
 In September 1988, the defendants moved to dismiss the 
complaint.  The district court dismissed part of the complaint, 
and it left the rest of the complaint substantially intact. See 
JA at 164.3  Thereafter, the district court certified the 
plaintiffs' proposed class pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23, and the class was divided into four subdivisions. 
See id. at 208-21.  Following the court's ruling, the parties 
began conducting discovery. 
 Prior to the conclusion of discovery, the parties began 
discussions at the suggestion of the district court in an effort 
to facilitate settlement.  Settlement conferences were held 
before a magistrate judge.  Following the conferences, the judge 
ordered the plaintiffs to submit any motions for voluntary 
                     
     
3
  The court dismissed all federal securities claims arising 
out of the 1983 offering, the section 10(b) claim arising from 
the 1986 offering, the RICO claim arising from the 1986 offering, 
the factual allegations that the 1984 and 1985 prospectuses 
failed to disclose that there was no reasonable basis to conclude 
that Garden State could be operated profitably, and all claims 
arising under section 17(a) of the 1933 Act. See JA at 164. 
  
dismissal, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a), 
which were to be accompanied by any purported settlement with or 
affecting the individual settling defendants.  Further, he 
ordered that, within fourteen days of any determination on the 
Rule 41(a) motions, the defendants were to file any cross-claims 
for contribution and indemnification.  In turn, ITB, First 
Jersey, First Philadelphia, and Rooney Pace all filed cross-
claims for contribution under the federal securities laws and for 
common law contribution and indemnification. See id. at 340, 943, 
962, and 978.  Additionally, First Jersey filed a cross-claim for 
contractual indemnity, pursuant to a series of private indemnity 
contracts between it and ITB. Id. at 946-49. 
 As a result, the plaintiff class submitted a motion for 
voluntary discontinuance of the derivative claims against the 
individual settling defendants and a proposed partial settlement 
agreement ("the first agreement") between the plaintiff class, 
the individual settling defendants,4 and National Union Fire 
Insurance Company ("National Union").5  National Union is the 
insurer of the individual settling defendants, but does not 
insure ITB. See id. at 227. 
 A. The First Settlement Agreement 
 The first agreement, see JA at 235-58, provided for the 
release of all claims against the individual settling defendants 
to the extent of their insured interest and the discontinuance of 
                     
     
4
  The first agreement indicates that Brennan was included 
only in his capacity as a director and officer of ITB. See JA at 
235. 
     
5
  National Union was not a defendant in this action. 
  
the derivative claims.  In return, National Union would 
immediately pay the class $3.125 million.  The class would pursue 
its claims against First Jersey, Brennan (in his uninsured 
capacity), First Philadelphia, and ITB. (the "non-settling 
defendants").6  Moreover, the first agreement provided that, 
"[t]o the extent that the class does not recover all or part of 
an additional $4.375 million from the non-settling defendants, 
National Union would pay all or part of this sum to the class 
with a cap of $7.5 million." See id. at 228 (Wexler Affidavit at 
¶ 7).  If the class later settled with the non-settling 
defendants and the amount of that settlement fell below $4.125 
million, National Union's consent to the settlement would be 
required.  National Union agreed not to unreasonably withhold 
that consent. See id. at 243. 
 In addition, the proposed settlement included a provision 
whereby the district court, in giving its approval, would order 
"that all claims for contribution or indemnification however 
denominated, against the settling defendants, based upon 
liability on any of the settled claims, in favor of persons, 
including [the] non-settling defendants are extinguished, 
discharged, satisfied and/or otherwise barred and unenforceable." 
Id. at 249 (the "bar order"). 
 ITB strongly objected to the first settlement agreement.  
First, ITB argued that any settlement by its fiduciaries, the 
individual settling defendants, that did not include ITB but did 
                     
     
6
  At that time, Rooney Pace, which is now a non-settling 
defendant, was in bankruptcy. 
  
include a bar order necessarily required its fiduciaries to 
breach their obligations to ITB.  Second, ITB claimed that the 
plaintiff class lacked standing to voluntarily withdraw the 
derivative action without providing any consideration to ITB.  
ITB reasoned that, as the derivative action belonged to the 
corporation and not the shareholders, the shareholders were in no 
position to withdraw the claim.  Accordingly, with the assistance 
of the district court, the first agreement was revised by the 
parties. ("proposed final agreement"). 
 B. Proposed Final Agreement 
 The proposed final agreement included the addition of ITB 
as a settling defendant and a statement that ITB consented to the 
withdrawal of the derivative claim.  In addition, ITB paid the 
sum of $250,000 to the plaintiff class, and it has agreed to pay 
an additional $150,000, if, and when, that amount is received by 
ITB pursuant to a contract ITB entered into for the sale of a 
mortgage note on Philadelphia Park, its former subsidiary. 
 The proposed final agreement also expressly barred the 
plaintiffs "from seeking from the non-settling defendants any 
amounts greater than the proportionate liability, if any, of the 
non-settling defendants for any damages, if any, determined at 
trial . . . ." JA at 1308 ("proportionate fault judgment 
reduction provision").  The bar order and the provision requiring 
National Union's consent to a settlement below $4.375 million, as 
they had been presented in the first agreement, remained intact. 
 C. The District Court Proceedings 
  
 The district court granted the plaintiffs' Rule 41(a) 
motion and preliminarily approved the proposed final agreement.  
Notice was then given to the class in compliance with Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and the court held a hearing on the 
proposed final agreement.  The non-settling defendants were the 
only parties who opposed the partial settlement.  On April 11, 
1994, the court entered judgment made final pursuant to Rule 
54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and formally 
approved the proposed final agreement ("partial settlement").7  
The court concluded that the partial settlement is "fair, 
reasonable and adequate, is in the best interests of the Class 
and ITB and should be and is hereby approved . . . ." JA at 1540. 
 The non-settling defendants Rooney Pace, First Jersey, 
and First Philadelphia ("non-settling defendants") filed a timely 
notice of appeal.  Non-settling defendant Brennan is not a party 
to this appeal.  The non-settling defendants contend that the 
district court abused its discretion in approving the partial 
settlement. 
 
 II. DISCUSSION 
                     
     
7
  On August 31, 1994, the district court filed an 
additional memorandum in support of its earlier decision 
approving the partial settlement.  Appellees made a motion to 
expand the appellate record pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 10(e) to include the August 31, 1994 memorandum.  The 
non-settling defendants opposed; however, on November 8, 1994, we 
granted appellees motion to expand the record.  In its 
memorandum, the court explains the appropriateness and fairness 
of the bar order and the proportionate judgment reduction 
provision. 
  
 Generally, the approval of a class action settlement is 
committed to the sound discretion of the district court.  It can 
endorse a settlement only if the compromise is "fair, adequate, 
and reasonable." Walsh v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 726 
F.2d 956, 965 (3d Cir. 1983); see In re Masters Mates & Pilots 
Pension Plan, 957 F.2d 1020, 1026 (2d Cir. 1992).  Where the 
rights of third parties are affected, it is not enough to 
evaluate the fairness of the settlement to the settling parties; 
the interests of such third parties must be considered. See id. 
 In the present case, the plaintiffs, ITB, and the 
individual settling defendants (collectively "appellees") argue 
that the non-settling defendants, as non-parties to the 
agreement, lack standing to object to the partial settlement.  We 
turn to that issue. 
 A. Standing 
 Non-settling defendants, in general, lack standing to 
object to a partial settlement, because they are ordinarily not 
affected by such a settlement. See In re School Asbestos Litig., 
921 F.2d 1330, 1332 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 976 
(1991); see also Zupnick v. Fogel, 989 F.2d 93, 98 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 384 (1993); Waller v. Financial Corp. of 
America, 828 F.2d 579, 582-83 (9th Cir. 1987).  There is, 
however, a recognized exception to this general rule, which 
permits non-settling defendants to object to a partial settlement 
where they can demonstrate that they will suffer some formal 
legal prejudice as a result of the partial settlement. Zupnick, 
989 F.2d at 98; In re School Asbestos Litig., 921 F.2d at 1332.  
  
"There is consensus that a non-settling defendant has standing to 
object to a partial settlement which purports to strip it of a 
legal claim or cause of action, an action for indemnity or 
contribution for example," or to invalidate its contract rights. 
Waller, 828 F.2d at 583 (citations omitted); see In re School 
Asbestos Litig., 921 F.2d at 1332. 
 Here, the non-settling defendants argue that their rights 
to indemnification and contribution, and First Jersey's 
contractual right to indemnification from ITB, have been 
extinguished by the bar order imposed by the district court 
pursuant to the partial settlement. See JA at 1302 (partial 
settlement at ¶ 2(a)), 1307 (partial settlement at ¶ 3(b)), 1543 
(district court's order approving the partial settlement).8  As a 
result, the non-settling defendants claim that they have suffered 
a cognizable prejudice by the approval of the partial settlement. 
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  In approving the partial settlement, the district court 
imposed the following bar order: 
     4   (a)  Each of the Non-Settling Defendants, 
each of the Settling Defendants, and any other 
Person who may assert a claim against the Settling 
Defendants based upon, relating to, or arising out 
of the Settled Claims, the Action or the 
settlement of this Action, are permanently barred, 
enjoined and restrained permanently from 
commencing, prosecuting, or asserting any such 
claim or claims for contribution or indemnity or 
otherwise denominated, against the Settling 
Defendants, as claims, cross-claims, 
counterclaims, or third-party claims in the Action 
or in any other court, arbitration, administrative 
agency or forum, or in any other manner, including 
but not limited to offset.  All such claims are 
hereby extinguished, discharged, satisfied and 
unenforceable. 
JA at 1543. 
  
 We conclude that the non-settling defendants fall within 
the recognized exception and have standing to object to the 
partial settlement.  We now address the merits of the objections 
made by the non-settling defendants. 
B. The Fairness of the Partial Settlement  
to the Non-settling Defendants 
 The non-settling defendants first argue that the 
inclusion of the bar order renders the partial settlement unfair 
and prejudicial to them. 
 1. The Bar Order 
 The non-settling defendants claim that the bar order 
extinguishes their right to seek contribution and indemnification 
from the settling defendants.  They argue that their right to 
contribution lies in the federal securities laws and in the 
common law, and their right to indemnification lies in the 
federal securities laws, the common law, and, as to First Jersey, 
in its underwriting agreements with ITB. 
 i. The Right to Contribution and Indemnification 
 
 a) Federal Securities Laws 
 The court agrees with the non-settling defendants that 
under section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "1933 Act"), 
they have an express right to seek contribution for liability 
under that section. See 15 U.S.C. § 77(f); see also In re Jiffy 
Lube Sec. Litig., 927 F.2d 155, 160 (4th Cir. 1991).  Although 
there is no express right to seek contribution under section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "1934 Act"), 
  
see 15 U.S.C. § 78(b), and Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, 
see 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, the Supreme Court has implied a right 
to seek contribution under both provisions. See Central Bank, 
N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1448-49 
(1994); Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins., 113 S. Ct. 
2085, 2091 (1993); see also TBG, Inc. v. Bendis, 36 F.3d 916, 923 
(10th Cir. 1994) (contribution under Rule 10b-5); Alvarado 
Partners, L.P. v. Mehta, 723 F. Supp. 540, 549 (D. Colo. 1989) 
(contribution under section 10(b)); Seiler v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 
102 F.R.D. 880, 885-86 (D.N.J. 1984) (contribution under section 
10(b) and rule 10b-5). 
 However, there is no express right to indemnification 
under the 1933 or 1934 Acts.  Further, those courts that have 
addressed the issue have concluded that there is no implied right 
to indemnification under the federal securities laws. See First 
Golden Bancorporation v. Weiszmann, 942 F.2d 726, 728 (10th Cir. 
1991); Riverhead Sav. Bank v. National Mortgage Equity Corp., 893 
F.2d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 1990); Baker, Watts & Co. v. Miles & 
Stockbridge, 876 F.2d 1101, 1104-05 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that 
there is no right to indemnification under section 12(2)); King 
v. Gibbs, 876 F.2d 1275, 1281 (7th Cir. 1989); Alvarado Partners, 
L.P., 723 F. Supp. at 549 (stating that there is no right to 
indemnification under sections 11 or 10(b)); Seiler, 102 F.R.D. 
at 885.  This circuit has not yet addressed this issue. 
 As will be explained below, indemnification runs counter 
to the policies underlying the 1933 and 1934 Acts.  In addition, 
there is no indication that Congress intended that 
  
indemnification be available under the Acts. See Baker, Watts & 
Co., 876 F.2d at 1105; King, 876 F.2d at 1281.  In drafting the 
Acts, Congress was not concerned with protecting the 
underwriters, but rather it sought to protect investors.  Here, 
it is the underwriters, not the victims, who seek 
indemnification.  We agree with those courts that have held that 
there is no implied right to seek indemnification under the 
federal securities laws. 
 In addition, in support of its right to seek 
indemnification from ITB, First Jersey relies on its underwriting 
agreements with ITB.9 
 b) First Jersey's Contractual Right to Indemnification 
 Each of four separate underwriting agreements between ITB 
and First Jersey contains provisions for indemnification.  In 
these provisions, ITB agreed to indemnify First Jersey from any 
and all loss, liability, claims, damage, and expense arising from 
                     
     
9
  The non-settling defendants also argue that they have 
common law rights to contribution and indemnification.   They 
claim that the two common law theories of liability asserted 
against them preserve their rights to indemnification and 
contribution.  The claims are: 1)respondeat superior, seeking to 
hold First Jersey liable for the actions of individual non-
settling defendant Brennan (the majority shareholder of First 
Jersey); and 2) the commission of waste and breach of fiduciary 
duty alleged in the Ninth Claim of the Consolidated Amended 
Complaint asserting a derivative claim for ITB. 
 These arguments are without merit.  First, Brennan, in his 
uninsured capacity, is a non-settling defendant.  Therefore, 
First Jersey's indemnification and contribution claims against 
Brennan would not be barred by the partial settlement.  Second, 
the Ninth Claim has been dismissed as part of the partial 
settlement. 
  
any material misstatement, untrue statement, or omission in the 
public offering. See JA at 1133, 1154, 1174, 1195. 
 Generally, federal courts disallow claims for 
indemnification because such claims run counter to the policies 
underlying the federal securities acts. See, e.g., In re U.S. Oil 
and Gas Litig., 967 F.2d 489, 495 (11th Cir. 1992); Baker, Watts 
& Co., 876 F.2d at 1104-05; Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 
418 F.2d 1276, 1288-89 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 
(1970).  The underlying goal of securities legislation is 
encouraging diligence and discouraging negligence in securities 
transactions. See Baker, Watts & Co., 876 F.2d at 1105 (citing 
Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath v. Horwitch, 637 F.2d 
672, 676 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 963 (1981)); 
Franklin v. Kaypro Corp., 884 F.2d 1222, 1227 (9th Cir. 1989), 
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 890 (1990); Globus, 418 F.2d at 1288-89.  
These goals are accomplished "by exposing issuers and 
underwriters to the substantial hazard of liability for 
compensatory damages." Id. at 1289. 
 The non-settling defendants argue that the policy of not 
enforcing indemnification provisions should not apply in cases, 
as here, where an underwriter was merely negligent, played a "de 
minimis" role in the public offering at issue, or was being held 
derivatively or vicariously liable. Non-settling Defendants' Br. 
at 28 (quoting Globus, 418 F.2d at 1288).10  We disagree.    
                     
     
10
  The non-settling defendants' argument would obviously 
not apply to the section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 allegations, 
because those provisions require more than "ordinary negligence" 
  
 A number of federal courts have held that this policy 
against allowing indemnification extends to violations of 
sections 11 and 12(2), where the underwriter is merely negligent 
in the performance of its duties. See LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, 
SECURITIES REGULATION 4632 & n.428 (3d ed. 1988) (citing negligence 
cases where indemnification was not permitted); see also Baker, 
Watts & Co., 876 F.2d at 1105, 1108; Franklin, 884 F.2d at 1227; 
Globus, 418 F.2d at 1288;11 Odette v. Sherson, Hammill & Co., 
Inc., 394 F. Supp. 946, 956-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (disallowing 
indemnification in a section 12(2) case).  We agree.  The 
policies underlying the 1933 and 1934 Acts demand that all 
underwriters be encouraged to fulfill their duties in a public 
offering, regardless of their role. 
                                                                  
for liability either as a primary defendant or as an aider and 
abetter. 
     
11
  Contrary to the non-settling defendants' assertion, it 
appears that the Globus rationale extends to section 11 
violations.  The Second Circuit stated: 
  Civil liability under section 11 and similar 
provisions was designed not so much to compensate 
the defrauded purchaser as to promote enforcement 
of the Act and to deter negligence by providing a 
penalty for those who fail in their duties.  And 
Congress intended to impose a "high degree of 
trusteeship" on underwriters.  Thus, what 
Professor Loss terms the "in terrorem effect" of 
civil liability might well be thwarted if 
underwriters were free to pass their liability on 
to the issuer.  Underwriters who knew they could 
be indemnified simply by showing that the issuer 
was "more liable" than they (a process not too 
difficult when the issuer is inevitably closer to 
the facts) would have a tendency to be lax in 
their independent investigation. 
Globus, 418 F.2d at 1288 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted); 
see Helen L. Scott, Resurrecting Indemnification: Contribution 
Clauses in Underwriting Agreements, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 223, 245 
(1986). 
  
 As stated, the federal securities laws seek, inter alia, 
to encourage underwriters to conduct thorough independent 
investigations.  Unlike contribution, contractual indemnification 
allows an underwriter to shift its entire liability to the issuer 
before any allegation of wrongdoing or a determination of fault.  
As such, indemnification, it is argued, undermines the role of 
the underwriter as "investigator and public advocate." Scott, 
supra n.11, at 225.12  If the court enforced an underwriter 
indemnification provision, it would effectively eliminate the 
underwriter's incentive to fulfill its investigative obligation.  
"The statute would fail to serve the prophylactic purpose that 
. . . underwriters make some reasonable attempt to verify the 
data submitted to them." Id. at 245. 
 In addition, if the court were to allow the non-settling 
defendants to avoid secondary or derivative liability "merely by 
showing ignorance[, it] would contravene the congressional intent 
to protect the public, particularly unsophisticated investors, 
from fraudulent practices." In re Olympia Brewing Co. Sec. 
                     
     
12
  As the Ninth Circuit stated: 
 The overarching purpose of the Securities Act of 
1933, and of the subsequent Exchange Act of 1934, 
was to restore confidence in the market.  
Confidence was to be restored by forcing the 
public disclosure of facts sufficient to permit 
prudent investors to understand the risks assumed 
when purchasing a security offered for sale to the 
public.  One of the most important changes brought 
about by the legislation was that it made 
accountable all parties responsible for public 
reports. 
Franklin, 884 F.2d at 1227 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 85, 73d Cong., 
1st Sess. 9 (1933)). 
  
Litig., 674 F. Supp 597, 613 (N.D.Ill. 1987).  As for vicarious 
liability, "[c]ertain employers . . . assume a higher public duty 
under the securities laws than do other persons, a duty that 
requires the affirmative exercise of a high standard of 
supervision." Id. at 613-14 (citing Sharp v. Coppers & Lybrand, 
649 F.2d 175, 181-82 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 
(1982)) (other citations omitted).13  The public depends upon an 
underwriter's investigation and opinion, and it relies on such 
opinions when investing.  Denying claims for indemnification 
would encourage underwriters to exhibit the degree of reasonable 
care required by the 1933 and 1934 Acts. See Baker, Watts & Co., 
876 F.2d at 1108. 
 The non-settling defendants also argue that it makes no 
sense to preserve their sections 11 and 12(2) statutory defenses, 
of due diligence and due care respectively, while they are 
deprived of the right to seek indemnification.  This argument 
lacks merit. 
 In order to successfully assert a due care or a due 
diligence defense, an underwriter must prove that it conducted a 
reasonable investigation and had a reasonable belief that the 
information relating to an offering was accurate and complete. 
See LOUIS LOSS, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATIONS 894-95, 898-900 
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  First Jersey is being held liable for the conduct of its 
agent, Brennan.  As such, it argues, that its right to seek 
indemnification from Brennan should not be barred.  In this case, 
because Brennan is a non-settling defendant, First Jersey is not 
barred from seeking indemnification from him.  Therefore, it will 
be able to recover if it is held vicariously liable for Brennan's 
conduct. 
  
(1988).  These defenses encourage an underwriter to act 
reasonably; they are not available to a negligent underwriter.  
Unlike indemnification, the statutory defenses support the 
policies of the act.  Underwriters will be more likely to act 
diligently in an effort to assert the defenses. 
 We conclude that the underwriter indemnification 
agreements between First Jersey and ITB run counter to the 
policies underlying the securities acts.  Although the non-
settling defendants had a right to contribution, they did not 
have a right to indemnification.  Therefore, the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in barring and extinguishing any 
causes of action for indemnification.  We turn now to whether the 
bar order impermissibly impinges on the non-settling defendants' 
right to contribution. 
 ii. Settlement Contribution Bar 
 In general, the settlement of complex litigation before 
trial is favored by the federal courts.  However, in multi-party 
litigation, settlement may be difficult.  Defendants, who are 
willing to settle, "buy little peace through settlement unless 
they are assured that they will be protected against co-
defendants' efforts to shift their losses through cross-claims 
for indemnity, contribution, and other causes related to the 
underlying litigation." In re U.S. Oil and Gas Litig., 967 F.2d 
at 494; see In re Jiffy Lube Sec. Litig., 927 F.2d at 160.  In 
cases involving multiple defendants, a right to contribution 
inhibits partial settlement. 
  
 Therefore, in order to encourage settlement in these 
cases, modern settlements increasingly incorporate settlement bar 
orders into partial settlements.  "In essence, a bar order 
constitutes a final discharge of all obligations of the settling 
defendants and bars any further litigation of claims made by non-
settling defendants." Franklin, 884 F.2d at 1225.  
 Many states have enacted settlement bar statutes, which 
allow a bar to the right of contribution if the settlement is 
made in good faith and the non-settling defendants are entitled 
to a setoff against any judgment ultimately entered against them.  
By contrast, however, the federal securities statutes do not 
expressly provide a settlement contribution bar. See In re 
Sunrise Sec. Litig., 698 F. Supp. 1256, 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1988). 
 A settlement contribution bar is designed to encourage 
settlements.  On the other hand, the right to contribution under 
the federal securities laws seeks to promote fairness to 
defendants and to deter wrongdoing.  "The purpose of a settlement 
contribution bar rule is to `harmonize the equitable objectives 
of contribution with the encouragement of settlement.'" Alvarado 
Partners, L.P., 723 F.Supp at 550-51 (quoting First Fed. Sav. & 
Loan Ass'n v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 631 F. Supp. 1029 
(S.D.N.Y. 1986)).  Therefore, we agree with the federal courts 
that "have imposed the bar as a matter of federal common law, 
finding that a fair and equitable settlement bars implied rights 
of contribution for federal securities claims." In re Jiffy Lube 
Sec. Litig., 927 F.2d at 160 n.2; see In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 
698 F. Supp. at 1257. 
  
 Because the federal securities statutes do not expressly 
prescribe a settlement contribution bar rule, in structuring the 
federal common law rule federal courts may either adopt the forum 
state's statute or fashion a uniform federal rule. See United 
States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979); see also 
Franklin, 884 F.2d at 1228; In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 698 F. 
Supp. at 1257. 
 The Supreme Court has stated, "Whether to adopt state law 
or to fashion a nationwide federal rule is a matter of judicial 
policy `dependant on a variety of considerations always relevant 
to the nature of the specific governmental interests and to the 
effects upon them of applying state law.'" Kimbell Foods, Inc., 
440 U.S. at 728 (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 
U.S. 301, 310 (1947)).  In cases involving the federal securities 
laws, we believe that a nationwide federal rule is preferable.14 
 Given our determination favoring uniformity, we next 
evaluate the particular settlement contribution bar adopted by 
the district court. 
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  There are sound reasons to adopt a uniform federal rule.  
First, contribution under the federal securities laws affects 
substantive federal rights.  Second, the issue is central to a 
federal regulatory scheme, and, therefore, national uniformity is 
desirable. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728.  Third, adopting a 
state's rule would lead to disparate results, because some state 
do not have a settlement bar rule, and other states have 
different types of bar rules.  Finally, if we adopt state law, we 
would encourage forum shopping and spawn wasteful litigation over 
the applicable state law.  We agree with those federal courts 
that have opted for a nationwide federal settlement bar rule. 
See, e.g., Franklin, 884 F.2d at 1228-29; Alvarado Partners, 
L.P., 723 F. Supp. at 551-52; In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 698 F. 
Supp. at 1257-58. 
  
 In the present case, the district court adopted the 
proportionate judgment reduction rule. See JA at 1544-45.  It 
concluded that the proportionate judgment reduction is the 
fairest method, and the non-settling defendants will not be 
prejudiced by a proportionate fault reduction. See Non-settling 
Defendants' Supplemental Reply Brief, Addendum, at 16-17.  We 
agree with the determination of the district court. 
 Under the proportionate judgment reduction method, the 
jury, in the non-settling defendants' trial, will assess the 
relative culpability of both settling and non-settling 
defendants, and the non-settling defendants will pay a 
commensurate percentage of the judgment.15  The risk of a "bad" 
settlement falls on the plaintiffs, who have a financial 
incentive to make certain that each defendant bears its share of 
the damages. See In re Jiffy Lube Sec. Litig., 927 F.2d at 160 
n.3; In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 698 F. Supp. at 1258-59.  As 
pointed out by the Ninth Circuit, the proportionate fault rule 
satisfies the statutory contribution goals of equity, deterrence, 
and the policy goal of encouraging settlement. See Franklin, 884 
F.2d at 1231.  The proportionate fault rule is the equivalent of 
a contribution claim; the non-settling defendants are only 
responsible for their portion of the liability.16 
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  The other commonly used setoff methods are the pro tanto 
method and the pro rata method. See In re Jiffy Lube Sec. Litig., 
927 F.2d at 161-62 n.3.  Neither method is at issue in the 
present case. 
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  Recently, in discussing a partial settlement, the United 
States Supreme Court stated that a proportionate share approach, 
the proportionate judgment reduction method, adequately protects 
non-settling defendants' contribution rights. See McDermott, Inc. 
  
 We conclude that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in imposing the bar order with the proportionate 
judgment reduction provision.17 
 2. Additional Objections 
 In addition, the non-settling defendants argue that 
Article IV of the partial settlement is prejudicial.  Article IV, 
paragraph 2(b) provides that National Union, the insurer for the 
individual settling defendants, will have to consent to any 
future settlement between the plaintiff class and the non-
settling defendants for an amount less than $4.125 million. See 
JA at 1298.  The provision further provides that such consent 
shall not be unreasonably withheld. See id.  The non-settling 
defendants argue that the district court abused its discretion in 
approving a partial settlement that gives National Union the 
power to be final arbiter of any future settlement. 
                                                                  
v. AmClyde, 114 S. Ct. 1461, 1466 (1994).  The Court stated, 
"Under [the proportionate share] approach, no suits for 
contribution are permitted, nor are they necessary, because the 
non-settling defendants pay no more than their share of the 
judgment." Id.  Although McDermott arose in the admiralty 
context, its rationale is applicable to the present case. 
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  In TBG, Inc. v. Bendis, 36 F.3d 916 (10th Cir. 1994), 
the Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of settlement bar orders: 
 We conclude that orders barring contribution claims 
are permissible only because a court or jury has 
or will have properly determined proportionate 
fault and awarded the equivalent of a contribution 
claim, not because of the compensatory award 
alone.  Since the court did not decide the 
settling defendants' proportional fault and order 
a credit in that amount, the court had no power to 
bar the non-settling defendants' contribution 
claim. 
Id. at 923. 
  
 As stated, the approval of a class action settlement is 
committed to the sound discretion of the district court.  The 
court will approve the compromise only if it is fair, adequate, 
and reasonable. See Walsh v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 726 
F.2d 956, 965 (3d Cir. 1983).  The partial settlement at issue 
does not affect the court's power to approve or disapprove any 
future settlement between the plaintiff class and the non-
settling defendants.  Essentially, the class plaintiffs have 
agreed not to present a settlement to the district court without 
National Union's consent.  In essence, this is no different from 
the plaintiff class rejecting a settlement proposal from the non-
settling defendants.  In addition, under the settlement, National 
Union retains an interest in any future settlement, because they 
may be called upon to pay additional amounts. See JA at 228.18 
 We conclude that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in approving a partial settlement that contained the 
clause in question.  National Union is not the final arbiter; it 
is the district court that will ultimately approve or disapprove 
any settlement.  In addition, National Union is under an 
obligation not to act unreasonably. 
 Additionally, the non-settling defendants complain that 
the partial settlement is unfair and prejudicial because ITB is 
not provided with any benefit.  We conclude that the non-settling 
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  Paul Wexler, attorney for the plaintiffs explained, "To 
the extent that the class does not recover all or part of an 
additional $4.375 million from the non-settling defendants, 
National Union would pay all or part of this sum to the class 
with a cap of $7.5 million." See JA at 228 (Wexler Affidavit at 
¶ 7). 
  
defendants lack standing to make this objection.  Assuming, 
arguendo, that the non-settling defendants are correct in their 
conclusion, they have nowhere argued that they are prejudiced by 
the dismissal of the Ninth Claim.  In fact, the non-settling 
defendants have received a benefit because the Ninth Claim has 
been dismissed, with prejudice, against all defendants. See JA at 
1541-42. 
 We conclude that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in approving the partial settlement. 
  C. Adequacy of the Findings 
 As stated, the decision whether to approve a proposed 
settlement of a class action is left to the sound discretion of 
the district court. See Walsh v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 
726 F.2d 956, 965 (3d Cir. 1983); Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 
156 (3d Cir. 1975).  In Girsh, we set forth several factors a 
district court must consider when evaluating the adequacy, 
fairness, and reasonableness of a settlement: 
 (1) the complexity, expense and likely duration of 
the litigation . . . ; (2) the reaction of the 
class to the settlement . . . ; (3) the stage of 
the proceedings and the amount of discovery 
completed . . . ; (4) the risks of establishing 
liability . . . ; (5) the risks of establishing 
damages . . . ; (6) the risks of maintaining the 
class action through the trial . . . ; (7) the 
ability of the defendants to withstand a greater 
judgment; (8) the range of reasonableness of the 
settlement fund in light of the best possible 
recovery . . . ; (9) the range of reasonableness 
of the settlement fund to a possible recovery in 
light of all the attendant risks of litigation . . 
. . 
  
Id. at 157 (quoting City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 
448 (2d Cir. 1974)); see also Stoetzner v. U.S. Steel Corp., 897 
F.2d 115, 118 (3d Cir. 1990).  Here, the non-settling defendants 
argue that the district court failed to provide adequate findings 
to support its approval of the partial settlement. 
 In approving the partial settlement, the court stated: 
  2.  The proposed settlement . . . is fair, 
reasonable and adequate, is in the best interests 
of the Class and ITB and should be and is hereby 
approved, especially in light of the benefits to 
the Plaintiff Class and to ITB because of the 
complexity, expense and probable duration of 
further litigation, the substantial discovery and 
investigation conducted, the risks of establishing 
liability, causation and damages and, with respect 
to ITB, the complete and final settlement of all 
claims asserted on behalf of the Plaintiff Class 
against ITB and the judgment reduction provisions 
of the Order with respect to all remaining claims 
against the non-settling defendants. 
JA at 1540-41.  In addition, in its August 31, 1994 memorandum, 
the court addressed the non-settling defendants' objections and 
explained, in detail, the fairness and reasonableness of the bar 
order and the proportionate judgment reduction rule.   
 We have held that in order to provide for meaningful 
appellate review, a district court must explain its reason for 
approving a class action settlement agreement. See Bryan v. 
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. (PPG Indus., Inc.), 494 F.2d 799, 804 
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974) ("It is essential in 
cases such as this that the district court set forth the 
reasoning supporting its conclusion in sufficient detail to make 
meaningful review possible . . . .").  The Bryan court noted that 
the "use of `mere boilerplate' language will not suffice." Id.; 
  
see also Malchman v. Davis, 706 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1983) (no 
intelligent review on appeal where district court adopted state 
court referee's report, making no independent findings of fact or 
conclusions of law); Maher v. Zapata Corp., 714 F.2d 436, 455 
(5th Cir. 1983); Gautreaux v. Pierce, 690 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 
1982) (district court must clearly set forth its reasons for 
approving the settlement in order to make intelligent appellate 
review possible); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1797, at 359 & n.39 (1986). 
 Here, the district court's explanation meets the 
requirements set forth by this court in Bryan.  The court made 
findings of the type articulated in Girsh, and it concluded that 
the partial settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate.  
Further, the district court's memorandum of August 31, 1994, 
explained the appropriateness of the bar order and the 
proportionate judgment reduction provision in great detail.  As 
we stated in Bryan, "To require a fuller statement of the court's 
views would turn a decision on approval of a proposed settlement 
into a determination on the merits in all but name." Bryan, 494 
F.2d at 804.  Contrary to the non-settling defendants' 
contentions, the court's explanation allows for a meaningful 
appellate review here.19 
 The judgment of the district court will be affirmed. 
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  The court has considered the non-settling defendants' 
additional contentions and found them to be meritless. 
